The C.I.A. versus GWBush

In his column today in the NYTimes, David Brooks writes about the apparent rift between the CIA and GWBush. He argues that the CIA has become an outspoken opponent of the President's foreign policy, especially with regards to the war on Iraq and various intelligence-gathering and intelligence-analysis issues. Brooks discusses the leaks and off-the-record comments supposedly from key CIA positions leading up to the election. Shouldn't we be concerned that an independent organization like the CIA would be so willing to speak out against the sitting President? Shouldn't it matter that this organization, apparently as a WHOLE, disagrees with the way this President uses and abuses our nation's intelligence process? Brooks is only concerned with how the President can bring the CIA back into line--who he has to punish, and who must be fired in order to restore allegiance to the CIA agenda.

The problem with that argument is that Mr. Bush has done nothing to instill confidence or loyalty in the agents and managers of the CIA. Not only has he blamed the CIA for both 9/11 and the missing WMDs in Iraq, but he appointed a right-wing congressman, Porter Goss, to lead the organization. This congressman, although he has personal experience as an agent, has apparently brought his congressional staffers with him to Langley. Does Mr. Goss really expect life-long CIA agents who have always tried to support the President's policies--liberal or conservative--to take orders from neo-conservative policy wonks who are used to dealing with members of Congress? Does the President really feel that he has ingratiated himself to an organization that has gotten nothing but blame from the administration?

On top of all of this division between the President and the CIA, one of the President's most outspoken critics, 'Anonymous' who wrote Imperial Hubris, has gone public and quit his job at the CIA. I have mentioned previously in this forum that 'Anonymous' has been widely known to be Mike Scheuer, former head of the CIA's bin Laden group. His opinions have made recent appearances in the Senate confirmation hearings for Porter Goss and are published in this month's The Atlantic Monthly. The article appears in the 'Verbatim' section under the title, "How Not to Catch a Terrorist."

Scheuer argues that it was not inadequate budgets, legal barriers between CIA and FBI, nor organizational structure that prevented our success against Osama bin Laden (before and after 9/11), but was instead the irresponsibility, arrogance, bad judgment, bad decisions of senior Intelligence Community bureaucrats. He lists ten instances in The Atlantic Monthly article in which decisions by these bureaucrats "have been at the core of our failure against Bin Laden."

According to Scheuer:
---The CIA knew as early as mid-1996 that al-Qaeda was seeking to obtain nuclear materials. This information was suppressed within CIA and then published in a shortened form.
---There were several instances in which the CIA was unable to secure the assistance or cooperation of either the US Military or other key intelligence agencies in either gathering information or in conducting operations to disrupt al-Qaeda activities. (Much of this information corroborates Richard Clarke's assertions that the US Military refused to help plan operations that might have captured or killed Osama bin Laden in the years between 1997 and 1999.) Scheuer suggests that in one such instance, another intelligence agency removed a key member of a planning group leading up to an operation in a foreign city. Later in that same foreign city, al-Qaeda destroyed U.S. facilities in the area.
---There were several opportunities to capture or kill bin Laden through military means, but these were always stopped because "intelligence was not good enough." Scheuer points to two opportunities in particular, one in which bin Laden was at "a desert hunting camp used by wealthy Gulf royals" that we could have attacked militarily, and another in which we had an excellent chance to capture bin Laden. "[A]n operation which showed no U.S. hand, risked no U.S. lives, and was endorsed by senior commanders of the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg." Apparently, this operation was cancelled "because senior officials from the Agency, the Executive Branch, and other Intelligence Community components decided to accept assurances from [an unreliable and untrustworthy] Islamic country that it could acquire Bin Laden from the Taleban."
---In June 1999, Scheuer moved to a new position and away from the bin Laden group. As part of his move, he made recommendations in a memo to his superiors regarding steps to be taken to improve the performance of the group specially tasked to counter al-Qaeda. Among these recommendations, he cited: "insufficient or no support from other Intelligence Community components," issues of the "grossly insufficient numbers of experienced officers assigned to the Bin Laden unit," and the "mediocre performance of our western allies - especially in Western Europe - in supporting U.S. efforts against Bin Laden."
---As of September 2004, "there are fewer Directorate of Operations officers with substantive expertise on al-Qaeda than there were on 11 September 2001" serving in the bin Laden operational unit. "There has been no systematic effort to groom al-Qaeda expertise among Directorate of Operations officers since 11 September ... The excellent management team now running operations against al-Qaeda has made repeated, detailed, and on-paper pleas for more officers to work against the [sic] al-Qaeda -- and have done so for years, not weeks or months -- but have been ignored."

Scheuer sums up his argument with these words: "The pattern of decision-making I have witnessed ... seems to indicate a want of moral courage, an overwhelming concern for career advancement, or an abject inability to distinguish right from wrong." These are strong words from a man who has spent years trying to understand and stop Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Can we as a nation choose not to heed his warnings and analysis? According to the CSMonitor article linked above, Scheuer has resigned his position within the CIA. He said in Imperial Hubris that if things did not change, he would be forced to take more drastic steps than simply writing books. Apparently, he has decided to become a public figure in the fight to stop al-Qaeda, and in the fight to protect America from mis-management and what he calls a want of moral courage. I think we all need to listen more carefully to what men and women like him have to say, even if we do not always agree with them.